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The recent outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) in Korea was unexpected that laboratory response had to be 
built up urgently during the outbreak. The outbreak was almost all healthcare-associated, which was aggravated by lack of avail-
ability in laboratory diagnosis of MERS-CoV on site. On behalf of the MERS joint public and private sector response committee 
(MERS Joint committee), the Korean Society for Laboratory Medicine (KSLM) launched a MERS response task force (MERS KSLM 
TF) to facilitate clinical laboratories set up MERS molecular diagnosis. MERS TF established guidelines for laboratory diagnosis 
of MERS-CoV and provided it to all participating laboratories as the official guidance of MERS Joint committee. This guideline 
was used for procedure manual of molecular diagnosis of MERS-CoV and laboratory safety manual. 
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Special Article
Basic description of MERS-CoV diagnosis
1. Korean Name
중동호흡기증후군 코로나바이러스 핵산검사 
2. English Name
Detection of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavi-
rus (MERS-CoV) RNA
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Case definition
1. Confirmed case [1-4]
1) Definition
Cases with positive MERS-CoV on molecular tests (irrespec-
tive of the presence or absence of clinical signs and symp-
toms)
2) Testing methods
a. Real time reverse transcriptase PCR (rRT-PCR): Detection 
of MERS-CoV RNA
b. Serological tests: seroconversion of MERS-CoV antibodies 




Cases corresponding to a)-b) below:
a. Cases with pneumonia or acute respiratory syndrome 
(clinical or radiological diagnosis) accompanied by fever 
and at least one of the following: 
i. Patients who developed symptoms within 14 days of 
visiting the Middle East (see definition of ‘Middle East’ 
below)
ii. Patients who have been in close contact with an indi-
vidual who visited the Middle East and developed fever 
and acute respiratory symptoms within 14 days
b. Cases with fever and respiratory symptoms (cough, dys-
pnea, etc.) and at least one of the following:
i. Individuals who developed symptoms within 14 days 
later after visiting a medical institution as a patient, visi-
tor or staff in Middle East
ii. Individuals in close contact with a confirmed MERS 
patient while he or she is symptomatic.
iii. Individuals who developed symptoms within 14 days 
later after visiting a medical institution as a patient, visi-
tor, or staff during the outbreak period, in which a 
MERS-CoV outbreak has been emerged; at least two 
confirmed cases.  
2) Definition of middle east
a. Region: The Arabian Peninsula and surrounding countries
b. Countries: Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Leb-
anon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen
3. Close contact
1) Definition: Individuals pertaining to two of the definitions 
below are classified as close contacts:
a. Individuals who do not wear appropriate personal pro-
tective equipment (individuals who were lacking any of 
the following: gown, gloves, N95 mask, goggles or facial 
shield)
b. Individuals pertaining to one of the following while a) is 
true:
i. Stay within two meters from a confirmed case 
ii. Stay with a confirmed case together as a patient, visi-
tor or staff in a clinic/procedure room/ward room
iii. Have a direct contact with respiratory secretions of a 
confirmed case
2) Among close contacts, individuals who present with fever, 
coughing and other symptoms are classified as suspect 
cases.
Test indications
Fee for detection test of MERS RNA are paid by the govern-
ment except certificate purpose to travel abroad and the tests 
is indicated in the following cases. 
1. Criteria of removal of quarantine for the 
confirmed cases
1) Patients with confirmed MERS must be treated in quaran-
tine.
2) For removal of quarantine, the following conditions must 
be satisfied:
a. Forty-eight hours without any symptoms: Absence of 
MERS-related symptoms (fever, respiratory symptoms, 
digestive symptoms), normalization of general laboratory 
findings, improved chest X-ray findings
b. Two consecutive negative PCR tests with a 24-hour inter-
val: lower respiratory or upper respiratory specimens, tra-
cheal aspirates
2. Confirmation of suspected MERS patients
1) Patients with tracheal intubation
Tracheal aspirate is preferred specimens for detection test 
of MERS-CoV RNA. 
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2) Patients without tracheal intubation
Both upper and lower respiratory tract specimens, such as 
sputum or bronchoscopic specimens should be tested at the 
same time.
* In order to increase sensitivity, a blood specimen can be 
tested. If detection test of MERS-CoV RNA is not available, 
seroconversion of antibodies using acute-phase and re-
covery-phase serum is required to confirm MERS.
3. Early diagnosis of MERS-CoV infection from 
close contact cases
Before close contact cases progress to full-brown MERS an 
early diagnosis is essential to prevent further spread. There-
fore, both upper and lower respiratory tract specimens are 
collected at the same time for the diagnosis of close contact 
cases when the symptoms are not overt [5]. Detection tests of 
MERS-CoV RNA are performed at least two times on the 7th 
and 14th days after exposure or whenever related symptoms 
are developed. To collect sputum specimens from the cases 
with no purulent sputum, he or she is carefully instructed to 
exert cough forcefully until the secretion from trachea is pro-
duced. Even if the tests are negative, close contact cases are 
quarantined until 14 days after exposure.
4. Differential diagnosis of unknown causes of 
severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) 
For all patients with pneumonia accompanied by fever, the 
detection tests of MERS-CoV RNA is incorporated to the diag-
nostic panels to differentiate the cause of SARI during MERS 
epidemics.
* Caution: There are many reports of co-infection of MERS-
CoV with parainfluenza, rhinovirus, influenza A (H1N1) 
pdm09, herpes simplex, and influenza B. Therefore, differ-
ential diagnosis for MERS-CoV infection is recommended 
even when one of the above pathogens is detected.
Specimen types and handling of detection tests 
of MERS-CoV RNA
1. Types of specimens
1) Both specimens from the upper and lower respiratory tracts 
are recommended at the same time.
2) Lower respiratory tract specimens: sputum, bronchoalveo-
lar lavage (BAL), tracheal aspirate, etc (Table 1).
* To collect sputum specimens from the cases with no pu-
rulent sputum, he or she is carefully instructed to exert 
cough forcefully until the secretion from trachea is pro-
duced.
3) Upper respiratory tract specimens: Combined naso-/oro-
pharyngeal swab, nasopharyngeal swab, nasopharyngeal 
aspirate (Table 1).
* For a naso-/oropharyngeal swab, a flocked swab is used 
and both specimens are added to the same viral trans-
port medium (this combined specimen has been report-
ed to increase the sensitivity).
4) Blood specimen
a. Whole blood: 
To be considered for suspect cases when it is difficult to 
collect a proper respiratory specimen (children, etc.)
Although it is best to test within 3-4 days of symptoms 
Table 1. Specimens for molecular detection tests of MERS-CoV RNA
Type of specimens Transport medium
Transport
condition
Category for transport of 
infectious substances x
Lower respiratory tract specimens 4°Ca
If the test is delayed by 72 
hours or more, specimens 
should be frozen and 
transported with dry ice
Category B 
Sputum Sterile container
Bronchoalveolar lavage Sterile container
Tracheal aspirate Sterile container
Lung tissue, biopsy or autopsy Viral transport medium or sterile saline  
(for bacterial culture)
Upper respiratory tract specimens
Nasopharyngeal aspirate Sterile container
Naso-/oropharyngeal swab Viral transport medium
MERS-CoV, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus.
aSpecimens for diagnosis should be collected within 7 days of the onset symptoms.
Lee H and Ki CH, et al. • Laboratory diagnosis of MERS-CoV www.icjournal.org64
appearing, testing is possible for up to one week, with 
5-10 mL of blood taken from adults and children, and at 
least 1 mL of blood from infants. For the acute phase, 
both molecular detection tests and antibody tests can be 
performed, and in order to look for seroconversion (Ta-
ble 2), recovery-phase blood is also required. Serum is 
refrigerated (4°C*) for storage, unless the tests are de-
layed by 72 hours or more, in which case the specimens 
are frozen and transported with dry ice.
b. EDTA blood: For collection of buffy coat cells by request 
of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
it should be transported at room temperature. 
     
2. Specimen collection
1) When collecting specimens such as sputum, tracheal aspi-
rate, or bronchoscopic aspirate, follow the guidelines for 
infection prevention and control for aerosol-producing 
procedures.
2) When collecting blood and other non-respiratory speci-
mens from suspected or confirmed patients, the collecting 
persons should wear personal protective equipment (N95 
mask, gloves, long-sleeved gown, goggles, and face shield).
Infection prevention and control for aerosol-producing 
procedures
1. Aerosol-producing procedures: sputum collection, tra-
cheal aspiration, bronchoscopy.
2. Principles of infection prevention.
1) Aerosol-producing procedures should be performed 
with the minimum of medical staff.
2) Personal protective equipment should be worn: N95 
mask or higher-level respirators, gloves, long-sleeved 
gown, goggles or facial shield.
3) Before and after patient contact, and after removing 
personal protective equipment, hand hygiene policy 
must be adhered to.
3. Location of procedure.
1) Negative pressure single room is recommended for 
aerosol-producing procedures, but when this is im-
possible, the procedure should be performed in an 
single room with isolated ventilation system, and 
change the total room air by 6-12 cycles/hour during 
the procedure; installation of a forced ventilation 
duct system is recommended.
2) After finish of the procedure, the room should be dis-
infected, and left vacant for enough time to ventilate; 
approximately 30 minutes if changes of 12 cycles/
hour.
3) Entry to/exit from the e room should be minimized 
during the procedure.
Diagnostic criteria
Criteria for detection of MERS-CoV RNA: a positive result for 
at least one of the following:
1. A positive result for at least two MERS-CoV-specific gene 
targets (upE, ORF1a, ORF1b, N) by real-time RT-PCR (rec-
Table 3. Methods and gene targets for MERS-CoV diagnosis 
Method of diagnosis Gene targets
Real-time RT-PCR upE, ORF1a, ORF1b, N
RT-PCR and Base Sequence Analysis ORF1b (RdRp), N
MERS-CoV, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus; RT-PCR, reverse 
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction.
Table 2. Serum specimens for antibody testing 
Patient classification Acute phase serum Recovery phase serum
Confirmed or suspect cases Blood specimens on the day of 
hospitalization within 7 days of onset
Blood collected 14 days after the acute phase 
specimen; the second recovery phase specimen is 
collected after a 7-day interval
Confirmed or suspect cases when sera 
is not collected within 7 days of onset
None Blood collected 14 days after the appearance of 
symptoms
Close Contact cases Blood collected within 14 days of the 
final day of exposure
Blood collected 14 days after the acute phase 
specimen; the second recovery phase specimen is 
collected after a 7-day interval
Close Contact cases when sera is not 
collected within 14 days of onset
None Blood collected 14 days after the final day of exposure
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ommended)
2. A positive RT-PCR result for at least one MERS-CoV-specific 
gene target [ORF1b (RdRp), N], plus confirmation by base 
sequence analysis of the PCR product (Table 3).
3. Diagnosis by serological tests
1) Seroconversion using two serum specimens collected at 
an interval of at least 14 days
2) The screening test with ELISA or IFA, and the confirma-
tory neutralization test
Specimen handling in the laboratories
1. During processing respiratory specimens, level D personal 
protective equipment and gloves should be worn. 
2. Aerosol-generating procedures are highly recommended to 
be performed inside a class II biosafety cabinet (BSC).
If the specimen container is open outside the BSC, it is es-
sential to wear an N95 mask and goggles or facial mask, 
and the bench must be sterilized afterwards
3. The guidelines by the manufacturer of the diagnostic kits 
should be followed.
4. BSC or other precaution must be used to prevent cross-con-
tamination during processing of nucleic acid extraction 
and making aliquots as below;
a. During pre-treatment of specimens manually, one by 
one processing is recommended rather than batch of 
multiple specimens.
b. The automatic nucleic acid extraction equipment devic-
es should be in use with concern of contamination
5. In the cases of contamination with specimen, the bench 
should be disinfected with 70% alcohol immediately, or as 
soon as the procedure is finished
6. Information to be added for the sputum pre-treatment pro-
cedure
Interpretation and report
1. Guidelines for interpretation 
1) Screening test based on upE-targeting PCR
a. Internal control-negative: No nucleic acid amplification. 
Taking into account the cause of PCR inhibition, try re-
testing a diluted specimen or repeating specimen collec-
tion
b. Internal control-positive, target amplification-negative: 
Negative, however, retesting is recommended if MERS-
CoV infection is clinically suspicious
c. Internal control-positive, target amplification-positive, 
with cycle of threshold (Ct) > cutoff: Indeterminate, re-
testing recommended
d. Internal control-positive, target amplification-positive, 
Ct≤ Cutoff: Screen-positive, perform the confirmatory test
2) Confirmatory test based on target genes other than 
upE, such as ORF1a, ORF1b, etc.
a. Target amplification-negative: Indeterminate, retesting 
recommended
b. Target amplification-positive, Ct > Cutoff: Equivocal, re-
testing recommended
c. Target amplification-positive, Ct ≤ Cutoff: Confirmed pos-
itive, report to the infection control unit and transport the 
specimens to the Provincial Public Laboratory of Health 
and Environment/Korea Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention
d. Positive results by Korean Centers for Disease Control: 
Officially confirmed positive
3) For suspect case or close contact cases, even if test 
results continue to be negative, the possibility of MERS-
CoV infection cannot be excluded, and the following 
should be considered in order to detect false negatives:
a. Causes of false negatives
b. Poor quality specimen
c. Specimen collected too early or too late
d. Specimen that has not been properly handled/transport-
ed
e. Fundamental problems with the specimen: virus muta-
tion or the presence of inhibitors
4) Resolutions
a. If the result was negative in an upper respiratory tract 
specimen, retest with an additional lower respiratory tract 
specimen.
b. Check the internal control for all reactions. 
c. When repeated tests are negative for patients with epide-
miological relevance and MERS symptoms, the specimen 
should be sent to the the Provincial Public Laboratory of 
Health and Environment/Korea Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention
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2. Report 
1) Basic information about the specimen
Patient’s name, age, sex, medical record number, identifi-
cation number, specimen number, ward, date of order, 
specimen type, specimen collection time, and specimen 
reception time
2) Report according to the testing results
a. Negative: ‘Screen negative’, recommendation with home 
isolation until 14 days after exposure
b. Indeterminate: ‘Indeterminate’, recommendation with re-
test with a new specimen after reporting to the infection 
control unit
c. Equivocal: ‘Equivocal’, recommendation with Retest with 
a new specimen after reporting to the infection control 
unit
d. Positive: ‘Positive but pending for confirmation’, transport 
specimen to the Provincial Public Laboratory of Health 
and Environment/Korea Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention after reporting to the infection control unit 
e. Positive confirmed by Korea Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention: ‘Positive, confirmed’, report to infection 
control units and follow up with MERS-CoV detection test 
until end of isolation 
3) Notes relating to sample quality, etc. 
4) Reporting time 
Laboratory guidelines for biosafety and infection 
control
Routes of transmission for Middle East Respiratory Syn-
drome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) appear similar to typical re-
spiratory viruses, with touch and droplet transmission being 
most important, but routes of transmission have still not been 
clearly investigated. Taking into account the incidence and fa-
tality of MERS-CoV, and the impact of laboratory transmission 
on public health, this virus demands strict safety control poli-
cies than other respiratory viruses. Thus, the exchange of in-
formation between clinical physicians and laboratory physi-
cian is crucial to minimize transmission risk factors when 
handling test specimens from suspected MERS-CoV patients.
1. Infection control during specimen collection
Laboratory and other healthcare workers collecting or han-
dling blood and other body fluids must obey the standard 
precautions for handling infectious substances.
2. Specimen packing and transport
1) Respiratory tract specimens must be notified to the labora-
tory before sending: “Suspected MERS-CoV” label attached 
to specimens
2) Precautions to be taken by staff in charge of test requests 
before sending to the laboratory
a. Specimens should be stored by a designated member of 
staff until all tests are completed.
b. While MERS-CoV is suspected, or confirmed, any labora-
tory tests involving respiratory specimens should be min-
imized where it is absolutely necessary for patient care.
3. Collection, transport, and storage of respiratory 
specimens and body fluids other than blood from 
suspected MERS-CoV patients 
1) The specimen container should be made of a plastic mate-
rial and be protected from leaks (e.g. screw-cap); contain-
ers made from breakable glass must not be used.
2) For all specimens (including any specimens not for MERS-
CoV testing purposes), a label should be attached includ-
ing the patient’s identifying information (at least two 
types), specimen information (MERS-CoV warning label 
required), test information, and the time of collection.
- The label should be made of a material that is not easily 
detached, and printed in a way that is not easily erasable, 
such as using a barcode printer.
3) Specimens for virus isolation/molecular diagnosis 
a. Store at 4℃ and transport immediately
b. Store at -70°C when it is not possible to transport within 
72 hours.
4) EDTA blood: Transport at room temperature
5) Transport of infectious (respiratory) specimens
a. Transport by person: Do not use pneumatic tube trans-
portation
b. Transport within an institution: After decontaminating 
the surface of the primary container by wiping with a 70% 
alcohol swab, place in a zip-bag and package within a sec-
ondary container for transport.
c. The secondary container should be made of a material 
that is hard and does not leak, such as plastic (PP) or met-
al. It must be possible to autoclave the material if it is con-
taminated. Even if the container is not contaminated, it 
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should be cleaned and disinfected regularly.
d. The specimen should be secure (with the lid facing up-
wards) so that it does not fall over or roll around within 
the secondary container.  
e. The transport personnel must be trained to deal with a 
spillage incident, and carry a spillage kit during transport.
☞ Refer to the guidelines for spillage incidents within the 
hospital
f. Transport outside the institution: Triple packing that ad-
heres to Korean CDC guideline for transport of infectious 
specimens
Triple Package
1) After labeling, the primary container carrying the speci-
men collected from a patient should be sterilized with 
a sterilizing agent.
* Sterilizing agent: 70% alcohol, or 1% Sodium hypo-
chlorite
2) After sterilization, the primary container is wrapped in 
an absorbent (paper towels, etc.) before being placed 
in the secondary container.
3) The lid of the secondary container is firmly sealed be-
fore placement in the tertiary container.
4) Data relating to the specimen (test request form) is 
placed in the tertiary container before packing.
5) The sender, recipient, and emergency contact are writ-
ten on the outside of the tertiary container.
6) After placing the tertiary container in an icebox, cooling 
media (ice packs) are inserted on all sides of the con-
tainer.
7) The infectious substance label, UN 2814, orientation, 
sender, recipient, and emergency contact should be 
written on the outside of the icebox. 
6) Recommendations during laboratory testing 
a. Use of protective equipment [6]
i. Level D personal protective equipment should be worn: 
Disposable gloves and a laboratory gown should be 
worn at all times when handling specimens, and a den-
tal mask and goggles should be worn when there is a 
risk of splashing from opening the specimen container 
(glasses are insufficient, and so goggles or a facial shield 
should be worn on top of glasses). After testing has 
been completed, all protective equipment should be 
removed and hands should be washed before leaving 
the testing area. When removing the protective equip-
ment, care must be taken not to contaminate the hands 
and body; an N95 mask should be worn when there is a 
high risk of aerosol production.
ii. Class II biosafety cabinet (BSC): A laboratory gown 
(long sleeves, covering the whole body, opening at the 
back) and disposable gloves must be worn. After com-
pleting work at the BSC, hands must be washed after 
removing gloves.
iii. Other safety devices - Use of safety equipment in-
stalled by the manufacturer
e.g.) Centrifuge double cover
When infectious specimens are centrifuged, the 
specimen should be loaded and unloaded from 
the bucket and rotor inside the BSC.
b. When handling specimens outside the BSC, minimize un-
intended contact with the specimen.
c. After work on the specimen has been completed, the BSC 
is sterilized with 70% alcohol.
d. Any objects that contact the infectious specimen should 
be disposable if possible, and if they become contaminat-
ed by the specimen, they need to be autoclaved before 
disposal.
7) Specimen handling during common tests (biochemical, 
hematological, and other tests)
a. When hematological or biochemical tests are performed 
using blood, serum, or urine specimens, standard precau-
tions should be taken, as with any ordinary clinical speci-
men.
b. Use a BSC when producing smears (cytospin, etc.) or 
counting the number of cells in bodily fluids other than 
blood (e.g. BAL). 
c. Respiratory specimens and other body fluids (including 
feces) are infectious specimens, and must be processed at 
a class II biosafety cabinet.
d. Tests that should be performed in standard precaution
i. Pathological tests of tissue that has been fixed in forma-
lin or inactivated by another method
ii. Molecular tests using nucleic acid extract
iii. Examination using an electron microscope after fixa-
tion in glutaraldehyde
iv. Testing bacterial and fungal cultures in a microbial lab-
oratory
v. Tertiary (final) package of infectious specimens: speci-
mens already enclosed in the secondary container
vi. Inactivated specimens (specimens in nucleic acid ex-
traction solution)
e. Procedures that should be performed using a class II BSC
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i. Splitting and dilution of infectious specimens
ii. Media inoculation for bacterial and fungal cultures
iii. Diagnostic tests for infectious specimens, other than 
isolation or culturing of MERS-CoV 
iv. Nucleic acid extraction from infectious specimens
v. When producing smears for microscopic observation, 
specimens should only be moved outside   BSC after in-
activation of MERS-CoV by chemical or heat fixation.
* Take care that neither the devices nor the bench in-
side the BSC are contaminated, and in the case of 
contamination, decontamination must be performed.
e.g.) Dangerous actions -  specimen pipetting (use fil-
ter tips or disposal droppers), specimen splitting 
and dilution (an absorbent, non-permeable mat 
must be used when moving specimen to the 
bench), excessive or rapid force during pipetting 
(to-deliver types are safer than to-contain types), 
disposing of disposable pipette tips in a waste 
container holding an antiseptic solution (the 
waste container should be used inside the BSC), 
using syringes (do not use if possible), burning 
(burners and alcohol lamps should not be used), 
writing (no writing is allowed inside the BSC)
* BSC decontamination: Fumigation must be per-
formed when the filter needs to be changed. 
f. Isolation or culturing of MERS-CoV requires BL3 equip-
ment and protocols.
8) Environmental infection control
a. All waste materials contaminated with infectious speci-
men, test tubes, pipette tips, and other disposable items 
are collected in a Y-bag, taped, and autoclaved before dis-
posal. Syringes and needles are placed in a medical waste 
container, and collected and incinerated by a certified 
waste management company, in accordance with the 
Wastes Control Act.
b. Contaminated disposable items are placed in a Y-bag im-
mediately, in the place that they were used. 
c. Sterilization method: At least 15 minutes at 121°C, 1 atm, 
by autoclave
d. Environmental surfaces (devices, surfaces of objects, etc.) 
contaminated with blood, body fluids, secretions, or ex-
crement
 i. Disinfectants : 70% alcohol or 0.5% sodium hypochlo-
rite 
ii. Specimens of feces or body fluids are disposed through 
the sewage system, in accordance with sewage regula-
tions.
iii. When disposing of liquid waste, care must be taken 
that it does not splash.
9) In the case of contact with infectious respiratory specimens 
from an infected patient without the proper protective 
equipment against aerosols, the KCDC guideline to treat 
the person who contact with confirmed case is followed 
e.g.) Spillage accident, specimen splashing onto an unpro-







Supplementary material can be found with this article on-
line http://www.icjournal.org/src/sm/ic-48-61-s001.pdf.
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